Risk Assessment Federal Activity Updated July 16, 2012
Monitoring, Containment, and Control
Review of the ability of synthetic organisms to multiply in the natural environment and identify, as needed, reliable containment and control mechanisms.
Recommendation
At this early stage of development, the potential for harm through the inadvertent environmental release of organisms or other bioactive materials produced by synthetic biology requires safeguards and monitoring. As part of the coordinated approach urged in Recommendation 4, the Executive Office of the President should direct an ongoing review of the ability of synthetic organisms to multiply in the natural environment and identify, as needed, reliable containment and control mechanisms. For example, “suicide genes” or other types of self-destruction triggers could be considered in order to place a limit on their life spans. Alternatively, engineered organisms could be made to depend on nutritional components absent outside the laboratory, such as novel amino acids, and thereby controlled in the event of release.
Activities
Federal
- Executive Office of the President – No activities identified.
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- National Institutes of Health (NIH)
- NIH guidelines for recombinant DNA research were updated in October 2011 to include synthetic DNA within the overall definition of recombinant DNA.
- National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Non-Federal
- No activities identified.
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