Risk Assessment Federal Activity
Periodic Assessment of Security and Safety Risks
Assess specific security and safety risks of synthetic biology research activities in both institutional and non-institutional settings including, but not limited to, the “do-it-yourself” community.
Recommendation
Risks to security and safety can vary depending on the setting in which research occurs. Activities in institutional settings, may, though certainly do not always, pose lower risks than those in non-institutional settings. At this time, the risks posed by synthetic biology activities in both settings appear to be appropriately managed. As the field progresses, however, the government should continue to assess specific security and safety risks of synthetic biology research activities in both institutional and non-institutional settings including, but not limited to, the “do-it-yourself” community. As part of the coordinated approach urged in Recommendation 4, the Executive Office of the President, working with the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others, should undertake and periodically update this assessment. An initial review should be completed within 18 months and the results made public to the extent permitted by law.
Activities
Federal
- Executive Office of the President – No activities identified.
- Department of Homeland Security – No activities identified.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- In September 2011, the FBI’s Weapon of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) listed a partnership with the synthetic biology community as one of its recent accomplishments. “To prevent the potential misuse of modern biological techniques, the WMDD has become a partner with the synthetic biology community to safeguard the American public,” the agency said in a 2011 statement. The head of WMDD further stated that WMDD will continue to examine emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology, from a preventative point of view and that its collaboration with the synthetic biology community can help it articulate safety and security concerns as they relate to weapons of mass destruction.
- Congress
- In June 2011, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 was introduced in the House. Sec. 304 of the bill would task the Secretary of Homeland Security with providing a report within 12 months “to the appropriate congressional committees on the homeland security implications of the dual use nature of synthetic biology.”
- Department of Energy – No activities identified.
- Department of Defense
- As part of its Living Foundries program, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has created an expert panel to help the program address and anticipate ethical, legal and social issues, as well as biosecurity and biosafety concerns, early in the program life cycle and to ensure that the implications of research are readily understood.
Non-Federal
- Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance, a 2007 report from the J. Craig Ventner Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Center for Strategic and International Studies, addressed the safety and security concerns posed by synthetic biology. The report assessed the current state of the technology, identified potential risks and benefits to society, and formulated a series of policy options for its governance.
